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BUSH V. GORE AND THE LAWLESSNESS PRINCIPLE: A 
COMMENT ON PROFESSOR AMAR 
Richard L. Hasen* 
INTRODUCTION 
Akhil Amar begins his impressive Dunwody Lecture by questioning 
whether there “are any new things left to say about the Bush-Gore 
episode.”1 It is a legitimate question to ask, given the torrent of scholarship 
since the 2000 Florida debacle.2 In some ways, Professor Amar follows the 
well-trodden path of liberal critics of the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in 
Bush v. Gore3 in arguing that: (1) the Florida Supreme Court did not 
violate Article II of the Constitution when ordering a partial recount of 
votes;4 (2) the U.S. Supreme Court majority failed to respect Congress’ 
role in resolving disputes over Electoral College votes;5 (3) the Court’s 
equal protection holding which ended the Florida recount promoted 
inequality, rather than equality;6 and (4) Chief Justice Rehnquist and 
Justices Scalia and Thomas voted strategically in support of the per curiam 
opinion’s equal protection holding because of the bad press that would 
come from having “a majority of Justices in fact reject[ing] each of the 
only two theories put forth by the Bush campaign to end the recount.”7 
Professor Amar’s arguments, though convincing to me, are unlikely to 
convince supporters of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Bush v. Gore. 
However, Professor Amar’s lecture makes a much broader point, one 
that has resonance for future election disputes well beyond debate over the 
legacy of Bush v. Gore. Drawing from the writings on all sides of the 
debate, Professor Amar teases out a consensus against lawlessness in the 
                                                                                                                     
 * William H. Hannon Distinguished Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. 
Thanks to Bruce Ackerman, Jonathan Adler, and Rick Pildes for useful comments and suggestions. 
 1. Akhil Reed Amar, Bush, Gore, Florida, and the Constitution, 61 FLA. L. REV. 945, 946 
(2009). A video of the original presentation is available at http://streaming.video.ufl.edu/~law/20 
090324-dunwody.asx. 
 2. For a summary of the relevant literature, see DANIEL HAYS LOWENSTEIN, RICHARD L. 
HASEN &  DANIEL P. TOKAJI, ELECTION LAW—CASES AND MATERIALS 299–305 (4th ed. 2008); 
Richard L. Hasen, A Critical Guide to Bush v. Gore Scholarship, 7 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 297 (2004) 
(discussing the various literature on the Bush v. Gore case at that time). 
 3. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 4. Amar, supra note 1, at 953; see Hayward H. Smith, History of the Article II Independent 
State Legislature Doctrine, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 731, 734–35 (2001). 
 5. Amar, supra note 1, at 953, 959; see Elizabeth Garrett, Leaving the Decision to Congress, 
in THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE, AND THE SUPREME COURT 38, 50–54 (Cass R. Sunstein & Richard A. 
Epstein eds., 2001) [hereinafter THE VOTE].  
 6. Amar, supra note 1, at 959–60; see Richard L. Hasen, Bush v. Gore and the Future of 
Equal Protection Law in Elections, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 377, 378, 399–402 (2001). 
 7. Amar, supra note 1, at 964–66; see Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Beyond 
Counting Votes: The Political Economy of Bush v. Gore, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1849, 1883–84 (2001). 
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resolution of election disputes.8 That is, Professor Amar shows that 
everyone agrees elections should be decided as nearly as possible under the 
“rules of the game” put in place on election day, and that it is illegitimate 
to change (or “twist”) the rules after the election ends.9 Where people part 
company in the Florida 2000 dispute is over what the rules of the game 
actually were on Election Day 2000, and who was more guilty in changing 
those rules after the fact—the Florida Supreme Court or the U.S. Supreme 
Court. 
This consensus against lawlessness in resolving disputed elections is a 
profound point, and one that can be used to help avoid future Bush v. Gore-
like debacles. In this brief response to Professor Amar’s lecture, I aim to do 
three things. First, I show why, even though there is consensus about the 
lawlessness principle in the abstract, consensus can never be reached about 
who was right in Bush v. Gore despite Professor Amar’s impressive 
arguments. Second, I show how the lawlessness debate replayed itself in 
the contest over the winner of the 2008 U.S. Senate election in Minnesota. 
Finally, I argue that an understanding of the lawlessness principle can be 
used to help avoid similar debacles in the future. In particular, disputes 
over election outcomes may be curtailed through statutory interpretation 
instructions directed to state courts which are passed ex ante by state 
legislatures and through increased centralization of election processes. 
THE LAWLESSNESS PRINCIPLE AND LACK OF CONSENSUS IN THE 
FLORIDA 2000 DISPUTE 
Even though there is consensus about the lawlessness principle in the 
abstract, consensus can never be reached about who was right in Bush v. 
Gore despite Professor Amar’s impressive arguments. 
First, note how each side in the debate over the Florida 2000 dispute 
paints the other side as descending into lawlessness. For example, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist viewed the Florida Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
Florida statutes as requiring a manual recount of punch-card ballots10 as 
“absurd,”11 “peculiar,”12 and an interpretation “[n]o reasonable person”13 
                                                                                                                     
 8. Amar, supra note 1, at 946.  
Let’s start by noticing that a wide range of scholars seem to agree with the 
following proposition: “The Supreme Court twisted the law in the Bush-Gore 
affair.” But here’s the rub: Which Supreme Court did the twisting? Some scholars 
(mostly liberal) say that the United States Supreme Court played fast and loose 
with the law, while other scholars (mostly conservatives), insist that it was the 
Florida Supreme Court that acted in a lawless, partisan fashion. 
Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1273, 1289 (Fla. 2000).  
 11. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 119 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
 12. Id. at 120. 
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would embrace. Further, to the Bush v. Gore majority, the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s “unsought responsibility”14 was to rein in an out-of-control Florida 
Supreme Court which was making up new rules for counting votes to 
benefit Al Gore. And to conservatives generally, the Florida Supreme 
Court was the lawless entity changing the rules of the game to help Gore 
get elected.15 
To Professor Amar, however, the Florida Supreme Court f llowed the 
existing rules for resolving election disputes, and it was the U.S. Supreme 
Court that changed the rules midstream. Under Professor Amar’s 
interpretation, the Florida Legislature delegated to the Florida Supreme 
Court the authority to interpret state election code provisions dealing with 
the presidency in the same manner as the court had interpreted other 
election code provisions.16 Those preexisting rules of interpretation 
required the Florida Supreme Court to interpret election code provisions 
consistent with the state constitution and its longstanding canon of 
interpretation favoring voters’ rights.17 As Professor Amar explains, 
“though the Florida Supreme Court did not explain itself perfectly in the 
rush of the moment, it largely did the right legal things and for the right 
legal reasons.”18 It was the U.S. Supreme Court that changed the rules, 
doing an injustice to the Florida judiciary, to the “pre-election Florida 
legislature that had deputized the Florida judiciary[, to] Congress, and to 
the constitutional structure that made the federal legislature, and not the 
federal judiciary, the ultimate judge of close presidential elections.”19 
“[T]he U.S. Supremes short-circuited the whole recount and remedy 
process, privileging the less accurate, less inclusive, and more 
discriminatory initial counting process.”20 
As diametrically opposed as these positions seem, they actually have 
more in common than first appears. Both sides believe that the election 
should be decided in accordance with the rules established beforeelection 
day, and that to change the rules after the election would be lawless, likely 
done to favor one candidate over the other in resolving the election dispute.  
                                                                                                                     
 13. Id. at 119. 
 14. Id. at 111 (majority opinion). 
 15. This is the position taken by the conservative scholars Professor Amar discusses, 
including Professors Epstein, Fried, and McConnell. SeeRichard A. Epstein, “In Such Manner as 
the Legislature Thereof May Direct”: The Outcome in Bush v. Gore Defended, in THE VOTE, supra 
note 5, at 13, 31–35; Charles Fried, An Unreasonable Reaction to a Reasonable Decision, in BUSH 
V. GORE: THE QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY 3 (Bruce Ackerman ed., 2002); Michael W. McConnell, 
Two-and-a-Half Cheers for Bush v. Gore, in THE VOTE, supra note 5, at 98, 101, 108–13. 
 16. Amar, supra note 1, at 952–53. 
 17. Id. at 952, 954. On this canon of interpretation generally, see Richard L. Hasen, The 
Democracy Canon, 62 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009), draft available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1344476. 
 18. Amar, supra note 1, at 955–56. 
 19. Id. at 959–60.  
 20. Id. at 963. 
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Even those taking the most radical position in the Bush-Gore 
controversy, that the Florida legislature could name a n w slate of electors 
after election day (a slate that would have favored Bush, given the 
Republican dominance of the Florida Legislature in 2000), have sought to 
justify such a choice as part of the rules of the game that existed on 
election day. They argue that such a late choice would not be an exercise of 
lawlessness, as critics have claimed.21 For example, Professor Einer 
Elhauge, who represented the Florida Legislature in the Bush v. Gore 
dispute, points to an old federal statute providing that “[w]henever any 
State has held an election for the purpose of choosing electors, and has 
failed to make a choice on the day prescribed by law, the electors may be 
appointed on a subsequent day in such a manner as the legislature of such 
State may direct.”22 Arguing from the text of the statute, the legislative 
history, and policy, Professor Elhauge concluded that the choice of electors 
had been left to the Florida Legislature before election day: 
On those rare occasions when the election process has 
failed to provide a timely or convincing result, it is 
perfectly legitimate for the problem to be resolved by the 
entity that both (a) was given clear constitutional authority 
over the matter; and (b) is most responsive to the will of the 
Florida electorate. This might seem inconsistent with the 
prior lesson that election officials and judges should be 
made nonpartisan, but it is not. Those officials and judges 
have the job of resolving election disputes in a timely 
fashion and in accord with pre-existing rules. For that task, 
one needs a neutral umpire. But when they fail in that task, 
or where there are no constitutionally valid pre-existing 
rules, then the democratic choice of the electorate will be 
unclear. At that point, we should want the best proxy for 
the electorate’s choice, and that proxy is the institution 
most responsive to democratic will in any state, its 
legislature.23 
 
                                                                                                                     
 21. Bruce Ackerman, As Florida Goes . . ., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2000, at A33, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/12/12/opinion/as-florida-goes.html (“Congress has allowed one 
narrow exception to its insistence on a uniform election day: It allows a state legislature to step in 
only when the state has failed to make a choice of its electors. [¶] That is not the case in Florida. 
The state made a choice when Gov. Jeb Bush signed a formal notification that the state’s 25 votes 
go to a slate of Republican electors. Since Florida has not failed to choose, its legislature cannot, 
under federal law, intervene further.”). 
 22. 3 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). There is a serious question whether or not this statute is 
constitutional, but that is a question for yet another Bush v. Gore article. 
 23. Einer Elhauge, The Lessons of Florida 2000, POL’Y REV., Dec. 2001–Jan. 2002, at 15, 32, 
available at http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/3462386.html.  
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What does it say that scholars all ostensibly agreeing with the same 
underlying principle—that disputed elections should be decided in 
accordance with the rules as they existed on election day—can reach such 
widely divergent results over how the 2000 Florida dispute should have 
been resolved? First, I put aside the possibility of anyone being 
disingenuous; in my experiences talking to election law and constitutional 
law scholars over the last nine years about this issue, feelings about this 
case are sincere and deeply held. Rather, the key is that the rules the 
Florida Supreme Court had for resolving the dispute were so unclear, and 
the stakes so high, that it was possible for well-meaning legal scholars to 
subconsciously latch onto this uncertainty about the rules in order to 
construe the law in a manner that favored the candidate that the scholars 
preferred. Cass Sunstein observed soon after the case was decided that 
views of the Florida controversy among scholars broke down along liberal 
and conservative lines, with liberals supporting arguments favoring Gore’s 
position and conservatives supporting arguments favoring Bush’s 
position.24 What was true in 2001 is still true in 2009. 
Before the Florida controversy, none of the scholars who ended up 
weighing in after the fact had given considerable thought to most of the 
issues that mattered in the dispute, such as: (1) the meaning of the term 
“error in the vote tabulation” used in an obscure Florida statute,25 (2) the 
power of a state legislature to name a rival slate of electors if there were a 
dispute about the state’s electoral college winner on election day, (3) the 
scope of state judicial power to construe legislative statutes in light of state 
constitutional provisions under Article II of the U.S. Constitution, (4) the 
scope of the Equal Protection Clause as applied to “nuts-and-bolts” 
election disputes, (5) the scope of the Florida Supreme Court’s ability to 
construe election statutes in favor of the rights of voter enfranchisement, or 
(6) countless other issues. It is fine and good for everyone to agree that 
disputed elections, especially for president, should be resolved using the 
rules that were in place before election day, but when there is a 
fundamental bona fide dispute as to the content of those rules, the 
lawlessness principle cannot lead well-meaning people of diverging 
political views to legal consensus. 
It is for this reason that Professor Amar’s conclusion that the U.S. 
Supreme Court erred will never convince most of those who have 
previously taken the opposite position. If anything, the passage of time has 
hardened old positions.26 Each time Justice Scalia admonishes Gore 
                                                                                                                     
 24. Cass R. Sunstein, I troduction: Of Law and Politics, in THE VOTE, supra note 5, at 1, 4–
8. After canvassing the psychological literature which may help explain the split, Professor Sunstein 
concludes, “Perhaps the perspective of time will help.” Id. at 8. 
 25.  FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.166 (West 2009). 
 26. Consider the public’s retrospective views of the fairness of the 2000 election.  
Although 44% of Democrats called the 2000 election somewhat or very unfair in 
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supporters to “Get over it,”27 he reignites the strong feelings that existed 
back in 2000. The combination of emotion and uncertainty means that we 
will never reach anywhere close to consensus on the most heated questions 
from the Florida controversy. 
BUSH V. GORE LAWLESSNESS REVISITED: COLEMAN V. FRANKEN 
Disputes over presidential elections are rare,28 but disputed elections for 
lower offices are far more common. One of the most recent high-profile 
examples was the dispute over the results of the 2008 U.S. Senate election 
in Minnesota, pitting incumbent Republican U.S. Senator Norm Coleman 
against Democratic candidate Al Franken. The Senate race in Minnesota 
was exceedingly close.29 Coleman was initially ahead the day after the 
election by 206 votes.30 State law triggered a manual recount conducted by 
a five-member canvassing commission.31 Franken was declared the winner 
by 225 votes.32 Coleman filed an election contest before a three-judge 
court.33 After a seven-week trial, the court declared Franken ahead by 312 
votes.34 It unanimously rejected Coleman’s grounds for an election 
contest.35 The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed.36  
 
 
                                                                                                                     
2000, in 2002 that number rose to 68% and in 2004 it rose again to 75.2%. On the 
other side of the aisle, 24.9% of Republicans called the 2000 election somewhat or 
very unfair in 2000, compared to 10.2% who viewed the 2000 election that way in 
2002 and 14% who viewed it that way in 2004. 
Richard L. Hasen, Beyond the Margin of Litigation: Reforming U.S. Election Administration to 
Avoid Electoral Meltdown, 62 WASH. &  LEE L. REV. 937, 943 n.28 (2005) (citing National Election 
Studies data from the University of Michigan, available at http://www.electionstudies.org). 
 27. Charles Lane, Once Again, Scalia’s the Talk of the Town, WASH. POST, Apr. 15, 2006, at 
A02, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/04/14/AR2006 
041401370.html (“Scalia had similar advice to a student in Switzerland who asked last month about 
the Supreme Court’s ruling for George W. Bush during the 2000 election. ‘Oh, God. Get over it,’ he 
said.”). 
 28. See Elhauge, supra note 22, at 31 (“In the 113 years since the Electoral Count Act was 
enacted, Gore was the first losing presidential candidate to contest an election at all.”); see also id. 
(noting other issues in the Florida controversy that had not arisen in at least 113 years). 
 29. The following facts are taken from the trial court’s opinion in In re Contest of Gen. 
Election Held on Nov. 4, 2008 (Contest of Gen. Election), No. 62-CV-09-56, 2009 WL 981934, at 
*3, *21, *22–25, *27 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Apr. 13, 2009), available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/election 
law/litigation/documents/MNfinalorder.pdf.  
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. In re Contest of Gen. Election held on Nov. 4, 2008 for Purpose of Electing a U.S. 
Senator from the State of Minn. (Coleman Contest), 767 N.W.2d 453 (Minn. 2009). 
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The lawlessness debate we saw in the 2000 Florida controversy 
replayed itself in the 2008 U.S. Senate election in Minnesota. Though 
Coleman had made a number of arguments in an attempt to get the trial 
court to count more votes, his key argument was that because some 
Minnesota jurisdictions used lax standards in deciding whether or not to 
count certain absentee ballots, the trial court must accept all challenged 
absentee ballots under the same lax standards in order to comply with the 
Equal Protection principles of Bush v. Gore.37 The trial court rejected 
Coleman’s argument, citing to Minnesota’s longstanding rule of 
construction that absentee ballot laws are to be strictly construed38 an  
rejecting his broad interpretation of Bush v. Gore.39 The state supreme 
court affirmed, holding that there were “clear statutory standards for 
acceptance or rejection of absentee ballots . . . .”40 It held further that any 
variations were the product of local jurisdictions using different methods to 
assure compliance with the same statutory standard given differences in 
resources, personnel, procedures, and training.41 
Assuming everyone agrees that courts should apply the lawlessness 
principle to resolve the Minnesota dispute, the indeterminacy of the rules 
that applied on election day in 2008 precludes the emergence of consensus. 
Is the “rule” that existed on election day the d jure statement of the 
Minnesota Supreme Court that absentee ballot statutes are to be strictly 
construed, and therefore allowing the court hearing the election contest to 
apply a laxer standard to challenged absentee ballots would involve 
changing the rules on election day? Or is the “rule” that existed on election 
day one that permitted jurisdictions de facto discretionary authority to 
deviate in some minor ways from the state election code’s absentee ballot 
statutes? The question is further muddled by the equal protection principles 
of Bush v. Gore itself, upon which Coleman had relied. There remains 
fundamental disagreement over whether Bush v. Gore has precedential 
value, and if it has precedential value, what the scope and standard for 
evaluating an equal protection claim brought under the case is.42 These 
                                                                                                                     
 37. Brief of Appellant at 19–20, Contest of General Election, No. A09-697 (Minn. Apr. 30, 
2009). Coleman’s opening brief on appeal is posted at: http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litiga 
tion/documents/MNElectionContest-Brief-4-30-09.pdf. His reply brief is posted at 
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/MNElectionContest-ReplyBrief-5-15-
09.pdf.  
 38. On this point of statutory construction, the Minnesota Supreme Court is in the minority. 
See Hasen, supra note 17. 
 39. Contest of Gen. Election, 2009 WL 981934, at *41–47. 
 40. Coleman Contest, 767 N.W.2d at 466. 
 41. Id. 
 42. On the precedential value question, see Chad Flanders, Plea e Don’t Cite This Case! The 
Precedential Value of Bush v. Gore, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 141, 144 (2006), available at 
http://thepocketpart.org/2006/11/07/flanders.html. On the dispute over Bush v. Gore’s meaning, see 
generally Edward B. Foley, The Future of Bush v. Gore?, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 925 (2007) (arguing that 
Bush v. Gore discourages judicial intervention in voting); Edward B. Foley, Refining the Bush v. 
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issues are not at all settled. 
Given the deviation between written law and actual practice, and 
uncertainty over the governing constitutional standard, good faith 
arguments can be made on both sides about whether counting additional 
ballots as Coleman demanded would be an application of the rules of the 
game as they existed on election day or a deviation from those rules. As in 
Bush v. Gore, consensus on the lawlessness principle in the abstract yields 
no decision on the right result in the Coleman-Franken dispute. The answer 
will have to come from elsewhere, and it is sure to be controversial. 
HARNESSING THE LAWLESSNESS PRINCIPLE TO LIMIT ELECTION 
CONTESTS 
An understanding of the lawlessness principle can be used to help avoid 
similar debacles in the future. In particular, lawlessness disputes can be 
curtailed through statutory interpretation instructions directed to state 
courts which are passed x ante by state legislatures and through increased 
centralization of election processes. 
The Florida and Minnesota disputes show that there are many sources 
for uncertainty about the rules of the game in existence on election day—
from unclear laws, to lack of law, to lack of interpretation of untested laws, 
to unclear rules of interpretation of election statutes, to machinery or 
practices that deviate from the rules as written. The more that can be done 
to eliminate or minimize these uncertainties, the greater the potential for 
consensus to emerge around the lawlessness principle. Simply put, if 
everyone signs on to the idea that election contests should be resolved 
under the rules of the game as they exist on election day, and everyone 
agrees on what those rules are, there is much less room for election 
litigation and recrimination. 
There are a number of ways to try to nail down the rules of the game 
before election day. For example, as I have suggested elsewhere,43 stat s 
should undertake periodic audits of election statutes and clear up 
ambiguities and holes that could lead to future election litigation. Here, I 
focus on two additional ways to narrow the area of uncertainty suggested 
by Professor Amar’s lawlessness principle. 
First, the rules of interpretation courts apply to construe election 
statutes must be clear in advance of a high-profile election contest. Many 
states courts have adopted the Democracy Canon, which states that election 
statutes should be liberally construed to favor the voter.44 In the Florida 
                                                                                                                     
Gore Taxonomy, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1035 (2007) (arguing that the adjudicatory context of Bush v. 
Gore is a crucial factor in determining its applicability to future cases); Hasen, supra note 6 
(discussing the threat to democratic values posed by Bush v. Gore); Daniel H. Lowenstein, The 
Meaning of Bush v. Gore, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1007 (2007) (proposing a narrow reading of Bush v. 
Gore). 
 43. Hasen, supra note 26, at 954. 
 44. There are in fact three variants on the canon.  
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dispute, the Florida Supreme Court had long applied the Democracy 
Canon, and it applied the canon to resolve the Florida disputes over 
statutory interpretation.45 In contrast, the Minnesota Supreme Court has 
rejected application of the Democracy Canon in the context of absentee 
ballot laws.46 
State legislatures should be on notice that courts adopt rules of stricter 
or laxer interpretation of election laws as a matter of course, and that these 
rules are likely to apply to disputes over the meaning of state election 
statutes. If state legislators are unhappy with how the state courts are going 
to construe election statutes, it may pass a statute directing the courts to 
interpret such statutes more narrowly or broadly.47 Such rules of 
interpretation may prove to be of primary importance in later election 
disputes. 
To be sure, the clarity to be achieved by settling rules of interpretation 
could be overcome in the passion of another Bush v. Gore. As Professor 
Pildes elaborates,  
Conceivably, [] the rules of resolving such a dispute could 
be made exceptionally clear in advance and their meaning 
widely accepted at the moment such rules were being 
applied . . . . But that situation is unlikely: precisely where 
the stakes are so high, forceful pressure will 
be . . . exploited and previously clear rules will be made to 
seem uncertain.48 
                                                                                                                     
The Democracy Canon has been applied primarily in three contexts: vote counting 
cases, in which someone relies upon the canon to argue, following an election, for 
the counting of ballots that have not been counted because of minor voter error, 
election official error, or a disputed reading of a relevant statute; voter 
eligibility/registration cases, in which someone relies upon the canon to argue, 
before an election, that a voter or certain group of voters who have been told they 
cannot vote should be allowed to cast a ballot that will be counted even through 
election officials have determined they cannot register or vote because of minor 
voter error, election official error, or a disputed reading of a relevant statute; and 
candidate/party competitiveness cases, in which a candidate or political party 
relies upon the canon (and particularly upon the voters’ right to vote in a 
competitive election) to argue, before an election, that a certain candidate or party 
should be allowed to run in an election or appear on an election ballot, even 
though election officials have excluded the candidate or party from the ballot 
because of minor candidate or party error, election official error, or a disputed 
reading of a relevant statute. 
Hasen, supra note 17. 
 45. See Amar, supra note 1, at 956. As Professor Pildes has pointed out, one way of 
understanding the Rehnquist concurrence in Bush v. Gore is as the reaction of a group of textualists 
disturbed by the more open-ended purposivist approach of the Florida Supreme Court. Richard H. 
Pildes, Judging “New Law” in Election Disputes, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 691, 721–22 (2001). 
 46. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
 47. For examples of such statutes, see Hasen, supranote 17. 
 48. Richard H. Pildes, Disputing Elections, in THE LONGEST NIGHT: POLEMICS AND 
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Perhaps so. But certainly in disputes below the presidential level, and 
perhaps even at the presidential level, greater clarity on election statutes 
and the meta-rules for their interpretation can narrow the range of bona 
fide disputes. 
The other way of narrowing disputes about the pre-existing rules of the 
game is for greater centralization of election processes. Think again of 
Florida, with its multiple types of voting machines, and its lack of 
uniformity over how to determine voter intent in the event of a manual 
recount of ballots (even among jurisdictions using the same machines). 
Think too of Minnesota, where some jurisdictions used laxer standards for 
judging the acceptability of absentee ballots than were used in the majority 
of Minnesota jurisdictions. Having a state agency impose uniform 
machinery and requirements helps to eliminate the gap between practice 
and written rules, or at least assures that practice across a state, even if 
deviating from written rules, is uniform. 
This latter fix will be much harder to achieve than the former one. The 
United States has a long history of radically decentralized election 
administration,49 and many election administrators and localities have a 
significant investment in the status quo and a desire to squelch any moves 
toward imposing uniformity, or even a set of best practices to be used by 
all election jurisdictions.50 
Still, the more that can be done to assure that the laws, rules of 
interpretation, machinery, and practices are uniform, the more there will be 
a common understanding of the rules of the game. Such a common 
understanding can work to forge consensus against lawlessness and toward 
quick resolution of election disputes. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Like Bush v. Gore itself, Professor Amar’s Dunwody Lecture on the 
2000 Florida controversy may be read in multiple ways with many 
complexities. One read of the Lecture is that it shows that the Florida 
Supreme Court was right all along, and that the U.S. Supreme Court’s per 
curiam opinion was a lawless decision that cannot be justified. Though I 
have much sympathy with Professor Amar’s arguments, to me he is 
preaching to the choir. My preferred reading of his Lecture is to see a 
broader point about election disputes. As Professor Amar has shown, when 
election disputes arise, people focus on the rules of the game in existence 
                                                                                                                     
PERSPECTIVES ON ELECTION 2000, at  69, 70 (Arthur J. Jacobson & Michel Rosenfeld, eds., 2001). 
 49. See generally ALEC EWALD , THE WAY WE VOTE: THE LOCAL DIMENSION OF AMERICAN 
SUFFRAGE (2009) (describing history of American election administration). 
 50. See Richard L. Hasen, Election Administration Reform and the New Institutionalism, 98 
CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (reviewing HEATHER K. GERKEN, THE DEMOCRACY INDEX: WHY 
OUR ELECTION SYSTEM IS FAILING AND HOW TO FIX IT (2009)), draft available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1392299.  
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on election day. When those rules lack clarity, the legal system creates 
multiple openings for people of good will to subconsciously find a result 
that is consistent with political preferences. The more we can define the 
rules of the game in advance, the better it is for our polity, and the more 
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